This is the first book to bring together Western and Chinese perspectives on both moral and intellectual virtues. Editors Chienkuo Mi, Michael Slote, and Ernest Sosa have assembled some of the world’s leading epistemologists and ethicists—located in the U.S., Europe, and Asia—to explore in a global context what they are calling, "the virtue turn." The 15 chapters have never been published previously and by covering topics that bridge epistemology and moral philosophy suggest a widespread philosophical turn away from Kantian (...) and Utilitarian issues and towards character- and agent-based concerns. A goal of this volume is to show students and researchers alike that the turn toward virtue underway in the Western tradition is being followed by a similar turn toward virtue in Chinese philosophy. (shrink)

This paper examines ordinary people’s responses to Jennifer Lackey’s Chicago Visitor case. In particular it examines responses regarding the case from participants with Taiwanese backgrounds and US backgrounds. The Chicago Visitor case is one of the most influential cases in epistemology in recent years and plays a significant role in a number of debates in epistemology. First, the case is used to suggest that the Credit View is mistaken. Second, the case seems to pose a problem for a virtue epistemological (...) account of the nature of knowledge. Our paper explores these points in relation to our survey results, which show that participants believe that the protagonist in the case does have knowledge and that the protagonist deserves some credit for his true belief. Our aim in this paper, however, isn’t only to discover evidence bearing on the discussion of the Chicago Visitor case and cross cultural differences related to that case, we are also interested in what else the case might tell us about epistemic agency. For this reason we also asked participants to tell us to what extent they thought that the protagonist would be at fault in a case in which their belief turned out to be false. Here most of the participants found that the protagonist would indeed bear some fault in such circumstances. Our survey results also show, however, that participants of US background tend to be likely to attribute less fault to the testimonial recipient in bad testimonial cases, than their Taiwanese counterparts. More generally, we explore what the result regarding fault can tell us about epistemic agency. (shrink)

This paper advances the claim that skilful reflection is a master virtue in that skilful reflection shapes and corrects the other epistemic and intellectual virtues. We make the case that skilful reflection does this with both competence-based epistemic virtues and character-based intellectual virtues. In making the case that skilful reflection is a master virtue, we identify the roots of ideas central to our thesis in Confucian philosophy. In particular, we discuss the Confucian conception of reflection, as well as different levels (...) of epistemic virtue. Next we set out the Dual Process Hypothesis of Reflection, which provides an explanation of the workings of reflection in relation to Type 1 and Type 2 cognitive processes. In particular, we flag how repetition of Type 2 processes may eventually shape Type 1 processes and produce what we call downstream reflection. We distinguish competence-based epistemic virtues from character-based intellectual virtues. We also explain how our metacognition account of reflection, drawing on a Confucian conception of reflection and the Dual Process Hypothesis of Reflection, explains skilful reflection as a master virtue. Finally we outline an application of our metacognition account of reflection to a current debate in epistemology. (shrink)

Much has happened in the field of contemporary epistemology since Quine’s “Epistemology Naturalized” was published in 1969. Even before Ronald Giere published his article “Philosophy of Science Naturalized,” naturalized philosophy of science had been influenced by the so-called historical approach. Kuhm, Lakatos, Feyerabend and Laudan all contributed importantly to this trend. In this light it has emerged, without a doubt, that philosophy of science is closely related to epistemology. This volume explores some of the relevant relations and will be of (...) interest to epistemologists and philosophers of science. (shrink)

Three key components of a legal case are evidence, fact and judgement. In a well conducted judgement there will be an appropriate relation between these three components. Epistemologists investigating the nature of knowledge have been concerned with an analogous three components and their relation. More specifically, epistemologists have been concerned with justification, truth, and belief and how these three components need to be related if there is to be knowledge. Given the analogy, the research of epistemologists plausibly has insights to (...) offer to legal theorists. In fact, as we shall see, what epistemology have to offer legal theory actually goes beyond this as well. (shrink)

This paper advances the claim that skilful reflection is a master virtue in that skilful reflection shapes and corrects the other epistemic and intellectual virtues. We make the case that skilful reflection does this with both competence-based epistemic virtues and character-based intellectual virtues. In making the case that skilful reflection is a master virtue, we identify the roots of ideas central to our thesis in Confucian philosophy. In particular, we discuss the Confucian conception of reflection, as well as different levels (...) of epistemic virtue. Next we set out the Dual Process Hypothesis of Reflection, which provides an explanation of the workings of reflection in relation to Type 1 and Type 2 cognitive processes. In particular, we flag how repetition of Type 2 processes may eventually shape Type 1 processes and produce what we call downstream reflection. We distinguish competence-based epistemic virtues from character-based intellectual virtues. We also explain how our metacognition account of reflection, drawing on a Confucian conception of reflection and the Dual Process Hypothesis of Reflection, explains skilful reflection as a master virtue. Finally we outline an application of our metacognition account of reflection to a current debate in epistemology. (shrink)

In this essay I examine the role that reflection plays in knowledge. I argue that a notion of reflection grounded in ancient Chinese philosophy can help us understand second-order or reflective knowledge in both the accounts of Confucius and Ernest Sosa. I also argue that reflection can help us understand the most ideal kind of knowledge. I begin my paper by laying out Confucius’ and Sosa’s accounts of knowledge, while at the same time drawing the reader’s attention to their common (...) concern with reflective knowledge. Next I draw on an account of reflection from Confucius and elaborate on it. With this account of reflection in hand, I return to Confucius’ and Sosa’s accounts of knowledge and show how this account of reflection can help those accounts of knowledge. (shrink)

This is the first book to bring together Western and Chinese perspectives on both moral and intellectual virtues. Editors Chienkuo Mi, Michael Slote, and Ernest Sosa have assembled some of the world’s leading epistemologists and ethicists—located in the U.S., Europe, and Asia—to explore in a global context what they are calling, "the virtue turn." The 15 chapters have never been published previously and by covering topics that bridge epistemology and moral philosophy suggest a widespread philosophical turn away from Kantian (...) and Utilitarian issues and towards character- and agent-based concerns. A goal of this volume is to show students and researchers alike that the turn toward virtue underway in the Western tradition is being followed by a similar turn toward virtue in Chinese philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper, we defend the claim that reflective knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge. We begin by examining a recent account of extended knowledge provided by Palermos and Pritchard (2013). We note a weakness with that account and a challenge facing theorists of extended knowledge. The challenge that we identify is to articulate the extended cognition condition necessary for extended knowledge in such a way as to avoid counterexample from the revamped Careless Math Student and Truetemp cases. We consider (...) but reject Pritchard’s (2012b) epistemological disjunctivism as providing a model for doing so. Instead, we set out an account of reflection informed by Confucianism and dual-process theory. We make the case that reflective knowledge offers a way of overcoming the challenge identified. We show why such knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge, while building on Sosa’s (2012) account of meta-competence. (shrink)

Scholars have typically regarded Confucius as an ethical thinker broadly construed and not as an epistemological thinker. This chapter seeks to overturn that view and, in doing so, has three basic goals. The first goal is to make the case that Confucian thought is of epistemological significance. Goal two is to locate the significance of Confucian thought within epistemology while accounting for the past overlooking of this significance. The third goal is to show that Confucian thought is not only of (...) epistemological significance, but that it can make a contribution to progressing contemporary epistemology. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the epistemic significance of Confucian ideas, rather than the ideas of Chinese philosophy more generally. It describes how Confucian philosophy has traditionally been seen by scholars of Chinese philosophy. The chapter introduces the reader to epistemologically significant Confucian ideas. Within the field of virtue epistemology there are two basic strands, virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. Both have roots in Aristotelian philosophy and have been revived and developed within post-Gettier epistemology. Virtue responsibilists often list and discuss intellectual (...) virtues such as: open-mindedness, conscientiousness, intellectual honesty, fair-mindedness, and inquisitiveness. Virtue responsibilists have tended to focus on the analysis of individual intellectual virtues. The chapter concludes by briefly setting out how our account of skillful reflection, an example of an account informed by Confucian thought, bridges the divide between virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. (shrink)

Many discussions of holism fail to see the scope ambiguity and the subject ambiguity involved in the doctrine. With the different scopes or sizes, there are both moderate and extreme versions of holism. With respect to the different subjects, meaning holism can be distinguished from holism about confirmation or disconfirmation, about belief-fixation or belief-content, or about interpretation or understanding. The principal aim of this study is to disentangle the distinct doctrines involved in holism and to characterize and assess meaning holism (...) in the works of Quine and Davidson. ;The Duhem-Quine thesis is generally considered as the origin of holism. Following Duhem's thesis concerning scientific confirmation or disconfirmation, Quine put forth a stronger and wider claim that our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body. The views held in common by Duhem and Quine have come to be called "confirmation holism". ;In addition to the epistemic thesis of confirmation holism, it will be shown that Quine holds the distinct semantic thesis of meaning holism. Quine's new nonreductivist perspective on the verification theory of meaning is a bridge from confirmation holism to meaning holism. Quine also argues for what he calls "moderate" meaning holism by proceeding through a naturalistic account of children's language learning and the thought experiment of radical translation. ;Davidson's disagreement with Quine's behavioristic approach toward semantic studies leads him to construct his own holistic theory of meaning--an "extreme holism" which employs a Tarski-style theory of truth as part of its fundamental structure. According to Davidson, if we can put appropriate formal and empirical constraints on the theory as a whole, a satisfactory theory of meaning will finally emerge as a result of applying the theory of truth in interpreting or understanding the utterances of others. ;Finally, a response is given to Fodor's criticisms of meaning holism. It will be explained that Fodor's worries about the disastrous consequences of meaning holism can be addressed; and it will also be shown that his arguments against meaning holism, especially when directed at Quine and Davidson, are unfounded. (shrink)

Semantics and metaphysics are different. However, many philosophers maintain that the two are very closely related. Semantics is usually considered as a linguistic subject that deals with the meanings of linguistic expressions. Metaphysics, on the other hand, is a philosophical enterprise that purports to explore the nature of the world and to describe the structures and constituents of it. It is not difficult to see why the two distinct areas can merge so intimately together. After all, we all agree that (...) human languages and the world we know are closely connected. Because of this, some philosophers approach the topics of linguistic issues from the metaphysical perspectives and construct their theses of philosophical semantics based on their metaphysical standpoints. It naturally results invarious confusions of the semantic debates and projects with the metaphysical ones. This paper aims to explore the confusions which lie between semantics and metaphysics and to suggest that we can execute the semantic project successfully without taking up any metaphysical dispute. (shrink)

This chapter demonstrates why the commonsensical idea of forgetting as simply a vice is problematic. It presents some philosophical arguments for the positive role of forgetting. Forgetting can be understood in many ways, for example forgetting as a cause of memory-seeming, forgetting as a reliable process of justification, forgetting as an intellectual virtue, and forgetting as a way of liberation. The polysemy of forgetting can be traced back to Plato’s conceptual distinction between ἐπιλήθομαι and λήθη. It echoes with the many (...) facets of forgetting by showing how the opposite of memory relates to different domains such as knowing and perception. Key to classifying the polysemy of forgetting is a taxonomy of forgetting according to the computational model of memory. It brings out how the tripartite stages of memory correspond to the different types of forgetting. (shrink)

Barry Allen's Vanishing into Things discusses intellectual traditions of Chinese philosophy through the thematic thread of knowledge. The thread takes us chapter by chapter from Confucianism, Daoism, and The Art of War to Chan Buddhism and The Investigation of Things. The final chapter discusses "resonance" and the part it has played in Chinese intellectual history.It wouldn't be surprising if such an ambitious work, covering the range of intellectual traditions that Allen covers, became fragmentary and disparate. After all, such traditions vary (...) in significant ways and in certain respects are unrelated intellectually. What arrests this tendency is the commonality that Allen identifies in the treatment of knowledge.... (shrink)

This paper explores the prospects for a Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. We begin by providing an overview of Duncan Pritchard's epistemological disjunctivist account of perceptual knowledge, as well as the theoretical advantages of such an account. Drawing on that account, we present and motivate our own Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. After distinguishing different sorts of memory and the different roles that memory can play in knowledge acquisition, we set out our account and argue that (...) the case for epistemological disjunctivism enjoys parity with the case for epistemological disjunctivism of perceptual knowledge. We also consider objections to our account. The first is from Joe Milburn and Andrew Moon, who argue against a general epistemological disjunctivism of memory on the basis of differences in memory types. The second objection arises from a Radford-like case whereby one's true belief is from memory even though one lacks rational support that is reflectively accessible to one. (shrink)

This paper explores the prospects for a Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. We begin by providing an overview of Duncan Pritchard's epistemological disjunctivist account of perceptual knowledge, as well as the theoretical advantages of such an account. Drawing on that account, we present and motivate our own Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. After distinguishing different sorts of memory and the different roles that memory can play in knowledge acquisition, we set out our account and argue that (...) the case for epistemological disjunctivism enjoys parity with the case for epistemological disjunctivism of perceptual knowledge. We also consider objections to our account. The first is from Joe Milburn and Andrew Moon, who argue against a general epistemological disjunctivism of memory on the basis of differences in memory types. The second objection arises from a Radford-like case whereby one's true belief is from memory even though one lacks rational support that is reflectively accessible to one. (shrink)

Relativism, the position that things are for each as they seem to each, was first formulated in Western philosophy by Protagoras, the 5th century BC Greek orator and teacher. This book focuses on the challenge to the possibility of expert knowledge posed by Protagoras, together with responses by the three most important philosophers of the next generation, Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus. In his book Truth, Protagoras made vivid use of two provocative but imperfectly spelled out ideas. First, that everyone is (...) a ‘measure’ of the truth, and that everyone is already capable of determining how things are, since the senses are the best and most credible guides to the truth. Second, given that things appear differently to different people, there is no basis on which to decide that one appearance is true rather than the other. Plato developed these ideas into a more fully worked-out theory, which he then subjected to refutation in the Theaetetus. Aristotle argued that Protagoras’ ideas lead to skepticism in Metaphysics Book G, a chapter which reflects awareness of Plato’s reaction in the Theaetetus. Finally, Democritus incorporated modified Protagorean ideas and arguments into his theory of knowledge and perception. There have been many important recent studies of these thinkers in isolation. However, there has been no attempt to tell a single, coherent story about how Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle responded to Protagoras’ striking claim, and to its perceived implications about knowledge, perception, and truth. This book offers a new account of this important chapter in the development of Greek epistemology. (shrink)

This volume is by no means out of place for a reader in the twenty first century as resemblances between the age of the machine and our own digital age are surprisingly numerous, particularly with reference to the patterns of intellectual response to unprecedented stimuli. The worrisome parallelisms and analogues are purposefully kept off stage for the imaginative audience to complement the plot of the real drama of the Industrial Revolution as it was witnessed by such imaginative medievalist 'knights' as (...) Carlyle, Cobbett, Southey, Pugin, Ruskin and Morris, intelligent thinkers who performed the universal 'type' rather than the subjective or egocentric in so far as their intellectual responses to the discrepancy between two dissimilar epochs was concerned. The reader is, therefore, expected to be engaged with the arguments of the 'neo-feudal', the 'moral-aesthetic' and the utopian 'social-aesthetic' arguments at the core of the book both imaginatively and intellectually. On the first level, he is requested to shuttle between two centuries separated by the length of a different century. On the second, however, he is expected not only to appreciate the artistically excellent literary works of prominent belletrists, but also to examine the clever polemics they developed as methods of treatment and persuasion aiming at a solution of the social and psychological problems that arose from the incongruity between the present and the past, with specific references to such significant concepts as those of time, history, progress and authority which are examined against the superheated touchstones of democratization, liberty, laissez-faire ethics, mechanization, poverty and social protest in the industrial city. (shrink)

Diese Arbeit untersucht den Begriff der Autonomie und des Menschenrechts bei Kant. Sie geht davon aus, dass die kantische Rechtsphilosophie nicht nur der grundlegenden rechtlichen Frage, ob und inwieweit eine Gesetzgebung überhaupt allgemeingültig sein kann und muss, sondern auch aktuellen Grundsatzfragen des Rechts eine plausible Antwort geben kann. Der Gesichtspunkt des Übergangs vom unbedingt guten Willen zur allgemeinen weltbürgerlichen Verfassung begleitet dabei den ganzen Verständnisprozess der kantischen Rechtsphilosophie. Erst durch die grundsätzliche Klärung des kantischen Autonomieprinzips in seiner Moralphilosophie und Rechtslehre (...) wird der umstrittenen aktuellen Menschenrechtsfrage, insbesondere der Frage nach dem Menschenrecht auf sittliche Autonomie, eine neue Interpretationsmöglichkeit eröffnet. (shrink)

Averroës, 1126-1198; Arab philosophy; views on; God; simplicity; pantheism; Islamic philosophy.

Articles on the fundamentals of Sankhya philosophy.

Concept of Knowledge in Indic philopsphy; a study.